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INTRODUCTION 
Legal scholars have devoted their energies to understanding the workings of 
a wide variety of social institutions-governments, corporations, families-but 
have rarely devoted comparable attention to the institutions in which they 
work: law schools. As a career academic pressed into temporary service as an 
Associate Dean, I was stimulated to consider how the insights about human 
behavior developed to explain the workings of other institutions might be 
applied to understand the administration of a law school. 
Lobbying is ubiquitous in law schools. Students lobby for grades, for exam 
conditions, for seats in popular courses. Faculty lobby for salary and for 
attractive teaching loads. As I started my stint in administration, my intuition 
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was that this lobbying generated little information that would improve the 
quality of law school decisions. My surmise was that opportunities for 
lobbying instead encouraged rent-seeking behavior.' 
A year's work in administration did not shake my basic thesis. Indeed, my 
first-hand experience left me somewhat surprised about just how ignorant I 
previously had been about the scope of rent-seeking within the law school 
community. At the same time, however, I had come to recognize that my 
initial conclusion (that rent-seeking is an evil to be minimized) required more 
careful consideration in the law school context, where many students expect to 
pursue careers as rent-seekers. In addition, I began to appreciate that in a few 
limited realms, lobbying could yield information that would improve the 
quality of administrative decisions. 
This article explores the role of rent-seeking within law schools. In Part I, I 
explore the premises that underlie the thesis that rent-seeking in the law school 
context is inefficient. Part II examines a number of the opportunities for rent-
seeking in law schools and suggests how institutional structures might (and 
sometimes do) reduce incentives for rent-seekers. Part III develops an 
alternative vision-that particularly within law schools, rent-seeking by 
students serves an important educational function-and demonstrates that even 
if a law school were to embrace that vision, institutional structures that 
discourage rent-seeking would generally remain desirable. 
I. RENT-SEEKING IN LAW SCHOOLS: WHAT IS IT AND 
Is THERE ANYTHING WRONG WITH IT? 
Suppose the federal government were to deal with a budget surplus not by 
cutting taxes or reducing the debt but by advertising that the surplus would be 
distributed to those persons or groups that make the most eloquent appeals for 
the money.2 The advertisement would undoubtedly spur some people to 
1 Rent-seeking is a term "designed to describe behavior in institutional settings where 
individual efforts to maximize value generate social waste rather than social surplus." 
James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-
SEEKING SOCIETY 3, 4 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., I 980). 
2 As Gordon Tullock has observed, the government is more likely to offer interest groups 
benefits other than cash: "The reason this method [ offering cash] is almost never used is that 
it would be too obvious. It is necessary to fool the average man, at least to a small extent, 
and hence a method of transferring funds to the special interest which is less efficient must 
be adopted." Gordon Tullock, The Backward Society: Static Inefficiency, Rent Seeking, and 
the Rule of Law, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE II 224, 229 (James M. Buchanan & 
Robert D. Tollison eds. , 1984). 
Moreover, the federal government would never run such an advertisement, nor would it 
have to. Interest groups and lobbyists understand that benefits are available to those with 
sufficient persuasive powers. As Richard Epstein has noted, "any grant of legislative power 
will invite 'rent-seeking' behavior; each group will try to use that legislative power to 
expropriate the wealth of its rivals." Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the 
Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 713 (1984). Moreover, "[i]ndividuals will let their 
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devote time and money to preparing their appeals. Although there is no 
guarantee that any individual would be successful, for many individuals, the 
investment in lobbying would have a higher expected return than a comparable 
investment in other activity. For each of those individuals, a decision to lobby 
would be rational. 3 But will the combined lobbying efforts of these individuals 
generate an overall social gain? 
One possibility is that the lobbying efforts will produce information that 
enables decisionmakers to improve the quality of their decisions. Perhaps, for 
instance, the government has earmarked money for scientific research designed 
to generate a cure for disease or to generate some other public good. 
Lobbying, in the form of grant applications, may enable decisionmakers to 
make decisions that best advance those ends, generating an increase in social 
welfare. 
On the other hand, the information derived from the lobbying process is 
inherently suspect. For many potential participants in the process, the expected 
return from lobbying is smaller than the return they can command by devoting 
their resources to productive activity. This will be especially true for potential 
participants who, individually, have small stakes in the outcome of the 
lobbying process. Because these potential participants, who may be large in 
number, may not find it worth their while to lobby, decisionmakers will find 
that their information base is skewed, making it less likely that government 
decisions will actually increase social welfare. 
Even if the information produced by lobbyists were accurate, however, use 
of the information would not necessarily result in social gain. Frequently, 
lobbyists compete over a fixed pool of resources; no allocation by 
decisionmakers will result in the production of more goods and services. In 
these instances, any allocations made as a result of the lobbying constitute 
economic rents-payments over and above what the lobbyists could command 
by deploying their resources in any alternative use.4 The competitors are 
merely fighting over economic rents. 5 
The cost of this rent-seeking behavior is two-fold. First, the resources of the 
wealth be taken away from them so long as the costs of changing such political outcomes 
are greater [note: original mistakenly reads "less"] than the amount of wealth taken away." 
Robert E. McCormick & Robert D. Tollison, Wealth Transfers in a Representative 
Democracy, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY, supra note 1, at 293. 
3 Sometimes the decision is not rational. For a game-theoretic examination of the 
conditions in which it would be rational for a participant to engage in the rent-seeking 
process, see Gordon Tullock, Efficient Rent Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-
SEEKING SOCIETY, supra note l, at 97, l O 1-12. 
4 See Buchanan, supra note 1, at 8 ("Resources devoted to efforts to curry the queen's 
favor might be used to produce valued goods and services elsewhere in the economy, 
whereas nothing of net value is produced by rent seeking.") 
5 James Buchanan offers the textbook definition of economic rent: "Rent is that part of 
the payment to an owner of resources over and above that which those resources could 
command in any alternative use. Rent is receipt in excess of opportunity cost." Id. at 3. 
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competitors are diverted from the production of goods and services to an 
activity that produces no goods or services. Moreover, rent-seeking begets 
more rent-seeking. Some potential participants in the rent-seeking process will 
initially calculate that their resources will generate maximum return in 
productive activities. As others engage in rent-seeking, however, the calculus 
may change. Persons who, at first, would have abstained from rent-seeking 
will enter the process to avoid becoming prey to less productive competitors. 
Second, allocating the economic rents requires the time and energy of a 
class of decisionmakers; someone must read and evaluate those eloquent 
appeals for money and other resources. Rent-seeking generates these costs 
even if we assume no "corruption" in the process, that is, even if the 
decisionmakers were to make good-faith efforts to determine which appeals 
are most eloquent rather than allocating the surplus on other criteria that better 
promote their own self-interest.6 
This analysis leads to the conclusion that legal regimes that promote 
lobbying for a fixed set of resources can be efficient only if the information 
generated by the lobbying has the potential to identify recipients who will use 
the funds in ways that will increase social welfare. Even in those situations, 
however, the costs associated with lobbying may overwhelm the increase in 
social welfare. In other circumstances, a regime that promotes lobbying will 
generally be inefficient; by reducing the incentive to lobby, the regime could 
increase the incentive to engage in productive activity and thus increase the 
aggregate wealth of society.7 
Move, then, to law school administration. Like the federal government, the 
law school as an institution has a number of benefits it can confer on students 
and faculty. For students, the law school can offer (among other benefits) 
scholarship money, the opportunity to enroll in attractive courses with popular 
professors, high grades that will increase employment opportunities, and the 
opportunity to take exams in advantageous conditions. For faculty, the law 
school can offer high salaries or research stipends (within budgetary 
constraints), attractive (which often means non-demanding) teaching loads, 
physical amenities, titles, and freedom from institutional duties. 
Unlike the federal government, however, every law school faces 
competition from other law schools,8 a fact that should (and does) reduce the 
6 The process of obtaining foundation grants is, perhaps, one of the best contemporary 
examples of rent-seeking. Because foundations solicit proposals for grants, universities and 
other institutions pay salaries and consultant fees to people whose specialty is not 
conducting the studies for which the grants are designed, but rather writing grant proposals. 
The efforts expended on these proposals do not in any way increase the aggregate funds 
available; indeed, the monies spent on soliciting grants reduces the total value of the grants 
themselves. 
7 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice 
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275, 310 (1988) (asserting that raising 
the costs associated with rent-seeking reduces incentives to engage in the practice). 
8 Increasingly, even the federal government faces competition from abroad, competition 
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opportunities for students and faculty to extract rents from the institution.9 For 
instance, a law school that pays faculty salaries above market rates may find it 
increasingly difficult to compete for students against other institutions with 
lower instructional costs. Similarly, an institution that routinely awards all of 
its students "A's" may find its graduates spurned on the job market, reducing 
the institution's attractiveness to applicants. 
Ultimately, however, competition among law schools places only moderate 
limits on the ability of a law school to dole out rents. First, law school 
prestige, a critical factor in applicant choice, is often fixed by events and 
achievements in the distant past. 10 A "brand name" law school, no matter how 
badly managed, cannot easily dissipate its power to attract able students. 11 For 
many applicants, it is association with the brand name, rather than the 
education the student expects to receive or the cost associated with that 
education, that makes a school attractive.12 Harvard Law School could double 
that may limit opportunities for rent-seeking behavior within the United States and within 
other nation-states. See generally John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World 
Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REv. 511 (2000) (discussing the prospect that free 
international trade will reduce power of interest groups within each nation state); John 0. 
McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation State and the Rise of the Regime of 
International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 903, 916-17 (1996) (discussing the prospect 
that international competition will constrain interest groups). 
9 Competition, however, may be limited by the American Bar Association' s ("ABA") 
accreditation process, which, by setting minimum standards for law schools, limits the ways 
in which law schools may compete. See Ronald Cass, The How and Why of Law School 
Accreditation, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 418, 422-23 ( 1995) (arguing that the accreditation process 
limits Jaw school competition by increasing costs of legal education, and particularly by 
increasing the cost of faculty); George B. Shepherd & William G. Shepherd, Scholarly 
Restraints? ABA Accreditation and Legal Education, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 2091, 2098 
(1998) (asserting that ABA accreditation standards restrict innovations in law school 
administration). 
Failure to become accredited is a serious handicap to a law school's ability to attract 
students. See Harry First, Competition in the Legal Education Industry, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
311, 328 (1978) (arguing that accreditation status affects a law school ' s ability to attract 
students because access to state bar exams and federal funding requires that students attend 
ABA-accredited institutions). 
10 See Brian Leiter, Measuring the Academic Distinction of Law Faculties, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 451, 455 (2000) ("But as the old saying goes: 'Reputations die hard and are long in 
being born.' The suspicion is widespread that subjective reputational surveys report 
yesterday's news about faculty quality, not today's."). 
11 See John Mixon & Gordon Otto, Contiguous Quality Improvement, Law, and Legal 
Education, 43 EMORY L.J. 393,442 (1994) ("[M]any law schools are immune from market 
forces. National law schools' status ensures an abundant supply of applicants who can 
afford the price of admission."); see also David C. Yamada, Same Old, Same Old: Law 
School Rankings and the Affirmation of Hierarchy, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 249, 261-62 
(1997) (emphasizing static reputations oflaw schools over a forty-year period). 
12 For an excellent account of the coordination function played by law school rankings 
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tuition, or give all students "A's," or double the average class size to reduce 
faculty teaching loads without fear of losing many students to schools outside 
the "top 10." 
Geography is a second factor that confers on most law schools some degree 
of monopoly power. For many law school applicants, the choice of law 
schools is limited by geographical factors often dictated by cost concerns or 
family commitments. Geography is especially important beyond the top 
twenty or so law schools where applicants may perceive that the lasting 
advantages of prestige will outweigh other issues. Many areas are served by 
only one law school or by one school in a particular "tier" in the law school 
hierarchy. Thus, prestige and geography together operate to increase the 
ability of law schools to dole out rents. 
Finally, with respect to already-matriculated students, mobility is extremely 
limited. Transfer to another law school is possible, but it is difficult unless the 
applicant has a record demonstrating academic success. Moreover, transfer 
creates significant personal and professional costs, including reduced 
opportunities for mentoring, difficult-to-understand transcripts, and a signal 
that the student lacks commitment. As a result, so long as the law school 
administration doles out rents in a way that does not generate financial cost or 
outside publicity, competition will act as, at most, a modest constraint. 
The analysis so far suggests that competition will not significantly constrain 
the rent-seeking process in law schools. By analogy to rent-seeking from the 
federal government, then, it would appear that the many opportunities for rent-
seeking create inefficiency. Remember, however, that it is the opportunity 
costs associated with rent-seeking that leads to inefficiency; people who 
engage in lobbying, an activity that generates no social wealth, would instead 
engage in wealth-producing activity but for the prospect of economic rents that 
lobbying might generate. Before concluding that rent-seeking is inefficient in 
the law school context, one has to confront a preliminary question: what 
productive activity would take place if rent-seeking were eliminated? 13 
With respect to students, a reasonable hypothesis would be that time 
and the importance to prospective students of purchasing a "brand name" education, see 
Russell Korobkin, In Praise of Law School Rankings: Solutions to Coordination and 
Collective Action Problems, 77 TEX. L. REV. 403,409 (1998) ("'High quality' students . .. 
need a way to signal their quality to employers that cannot be imitated by 'lower quality' 
students. They do this by responding to rankings. By choosing a school with a high 
ranking, the student sends an important signal to future employers: he is brainy or clever 
enough to be accepted by a more selective school."). 
13 See David Gray Carlson, Debt Collection as Rent Seeking, 79 MINN. L. REv. 817, 817 
(1995). Carlson's critique identifies an often-ignored assumption in the literature on rent-
seeking behavior: the assumption that the second best alternative available to rent-seekers 
would not create negative externalities. He points out, however, that this assumption is not 
invariably true. In his words, perhaps the potential rent-seeker's next best alternative "is 
robbing banks or kidnapping children or something socially worse than the petty corruption 
at hand." Id. 
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devoted to lobbying is time diverted from some combination of studying and 
personal entertainment. 14 Although reading novels and watching basketball 
games undoubtedly increase student happiness, it seems reasonable to assume 
that the inefficiency caused by less student leisure is de minimis. Is the same 
true of lost study time? Study time in this context includes not merely time 
squirreled away in the library but also time spent in discussion with classmates 
and faculty about legal theory and practice. 
Suppose legal education makes students better lawyers. On this assumption, 
fewer hours devoted to legal education would generate less capable lawyers. 
Therefore, if students devote time to lobbying rather than studying, they divert 
energies from productive activity to activity that generates no social wealth. 15 
If students recognize that studying contributes to their professional capacity, 
many will choose to study rather than to lobby even if rent-seeking 
opportunities are available. But for others, the benefits available from rent-
seeking-higher grades, better or easier courses-will appear more attractive 
than the marginal benefits derived from additional hours of study. 16 The 
decision of these students to lobby generates a social cost-fewer well-trained 
lawyers- with no corresponding social benefit. 
Now suppose that legal education does not create better lawyers but merely 
provides a sorting mechanism for legal employers. 17 Make the further 
assumption that employers prefer high grades because those grades generally 
predict strong lawyering abilities. 18 On these assumptions, student lobbying 
generates social costs if studying would be helpful in obtaining higher grades. 
Only if studying were not helpful in obtaining higher grades-if some students 
are born to take law school exams and others are not-would time spent 
lobbying be free of social cost. 19 
14 Another possibility would be that students would reduce the hours they devote to part-
time work in order to pursue lobbying. Assuming that the opportunities for lobbying for any 
individual student are sporadic rather than continuous, the likelihood that a student would 
adjust his or her work schedule to accommodate increased lobbying appears slim. 
15 The calculus changes somewhat if lobbying itself contributes to the student's legal 
education. See discussion infra Part III. 
16 Indeed, the students least likely to succeed in the profession may be those most likely 
to engage in rent-seeking. For them, the gains to be derived from additional studying may 
be small, so the opportunity cost ofrent-seeking will also be small. 
17 See Korobkin, supra note 12, at 409 (discussing the sorting function of legal 
education). 
18 It is possible, of course, that law school grades do not correlate at all with lawyering 
skills but that employers need to sort applicants on some basis and use law school grades 
because they seem less arbitrary than other, equally irrelevant, criteria, such as skin color, 
eye color, or length of last name. 
19 Beyond opportunity cost, a law school regime that encourages student rent-seeking 
generates another cost: demoralization of students. When lobbying efforts prove 
unsuccessful, the student lobbyist can become frustrated and demoralized by his failure ; 
when lobbying efforts are successful in obtaining rents, classmates may become resentful. 
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Similarly, faculty rent-seeking would appear to divert time from more 
productive pursuits, such as scholarship and preparation for class. One might 
question the intrinsic global value of each additional work of legal scholarship, 
but at the very least, scholarship has value in sorting academic institutions.20 
Moreover, from the institution's own perspective, additional faculty 
scholarship brings distinction that assists in attracting new students and 
faculty. 21 
Finally-and from the perspective of an Associate Dean, this is a critical 
part-rent-seeking by students and faculty does more than divert the energies 
of the rent-seekers; rent-seeking also requires time and energy to respond to 
the lobbying efforts by the various constituencies. This, in tum, could require 
hiring additional administrative personnel or diverting existing administrators 
from scholarship or teaching or, even worse from the institution's perspective, 
from fundraising. 
Rent-seeking, then, can be a drain on the resources of the law school-
students, faculty, and administrators. Thus, the next question is whether rent-
seeking is a constant or whether governance rules can reduce the incidence of 
rent-seeking within the law school community. 
II. CONTROLLING RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR 
Law school governance structures are not pre-ordained. Like other 
institutions, law schools can choose governance structures that confer on 
decisionmakers more or less discretion.22 The choice necessarily involves 
tradeoffs. Inflexible rules arguably increase the risk of error in administrative 
determinations because the rules may not contemplate all situations that 
subsequently arise.23 At the same time, broad grants of discretion-at least in 
the law school context-are likely to generate more rent-seeking than 
inflexible rules that leave the decisionmaker with little discretion. 
First, inflexible rules discourage rent-seeking because the rent-seeker's 
probability of success is reduced.24 If the rent-seeker's time has any value, 
20 Scholarship plays a significant role in most law school rankings. U.S. News and 
World Report, for instance, includes scholarship indirectly by measuring academic 
reputation. Other influential rankings focus more directly on faculty scholarship as a basis 
for sorting schools. See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 10, at 455-56. 
21 With respect to preparation for class, if we assume that more preparation leads to 
better teaching-as measured either by improved quality of lawyering by students in the 
class or by increased student satisfaction with the class-the institution as a whole benefits 
from improved teaching, either through improved employment opportunities or through 
increased alumni giving. 
22 See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 
72-76 (1983) (discussing the tradeoffs among rules conferring on decisionmakers various 
levels of discretion). 
23 See id. at 73. 
24 Gordon Tullock has made the point by noting that if Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago 
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why squander that time on requests that the decisionmaker cannot grant? By 
contrast, if the decisionmaker has discretion, the investment in lobbying has a 
greater expected return. 25 In addition, when the decisionmaker has discretion, 
the rent-seeker has another weapon in his arsenal: skewed incentives for the 
decisionmaker. If the decisionmaker accedes to the rent-seeker's request, the 
decisionmaker is, at least in the short run, finished with the rent-seeker. By 
contrast, if the decisionmaker says no, the rent-seeker may continue to lobby, 
forcing the decisionmaker to expend more time and energy considering the 
request. This fact itself increases the incentive for rent-seekers to lobby in a 
regime where decisionmakers have discretion. 
Second, inflexible rules reduce the time spent on each lobbying effort even 
when rent-seekers persist in the face of a rule. Rather than explaining to the 
lobbyist why his or her request lacks merit, the decisionmaker can simply 
represent that her hands are tied-an answer that is short and sweet but also 
less threatening to the psyche of the rent-seeker.26 
Inflexible rules, of course, ~re no panacea. So long as rent-seekers face little 
opportunity cost, lobbying will continue even if the lobbyists perceive that the 
likelihood of success is small. 27 Moreover, students, conditioned by 
undergraduate experience in which persistence has had a payoff, may 
overestimate the likelihood of success, reducing further the deterrent effect of a 
law school's regime of inflexible rules. At the margin, however, inflexible 
rules will generate less rent-seeking than discretionary rules. 
Of course, a regime of inflexible rules might shift some rent-seeking to the 
rulemaking process. But rent-seekers, especially in the law school context, 
will recognize that success will be more difficult to achieve in the rulemaking 
process. When a student lobbies for a higher grade or for more scholarship 
money, or a faculty member lobbies for a lighter teaching load, the lobbying is 
done in private. The rent-seeker's hope is that the decisionmaker will yield 
without giving the opposition a chance to mobilize; indeed, the rent-seeker 
may hope that classmates or colleagues do not recognize the harm they have 
suffered as a result of rent-seeking. The rulemaking process, by contrast, is 
had confined all of his lucrative appointments to close relatives and made his nepotism 
policy well known, the social savings would have been considerable because non-relatives 
would not have wasted time rent-seeking. Tullock, supra note 3, at 103. 
25 Cf Clayton P. Gillette, Expropriation and Institutional Design in State and Local 
Government Law, 80 VA. L. REv. 625, 633 (I 994) (arguing that flexibility requires targets 
of regulation to invest more effort in ascertaining the scope of their authority because the 
measure of acceptable behavior is less certain). 
26 See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953, 977 (I 995) (stating 
that rules can avoid the humiliation associated with exercises of discretion). 
27 If the opportunity costs for rent-seeking students are small, one might conclude that 
rent-seeking generates little inefficiency; if students did not engage in rent-seeking, they 
would not engage in any more productive activity. This conclusion, however, ignores the 
fact that student rent-seekers have power to impose costs on others-faculty or 
administrators-who must listen to their pleas. 
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inherently public, and building the coalitions necessary to change existing 
allocations is likely to be difficult. As a result, potential rent-seekers will often 
recognize that the effort is doomed, reducing the incentive to engage in rent-
seeking to begin with. 
None of this is to suggest that a regime of inflexible rules operates without 
cost. Lobbying has the potential to produce information of value to law school 
decisionmakers either because the information will improve the law school's 
overall reputation or because the lobbying process will improve institutional 
morale by reducing the sense that decisions have been made arbitrarily.28 My 
point is threefold. First, the information generated by a discretionary 
governance regime is often low-quality information that will not significantly 
improve the decision-making process. Second, to the extent a discretionary 
system generates information that is useful at the margin, the information 
comes at a price measured in hours of lost productive time. Finally, the 
discretionary system itself has the potential for generating significant 
unfairness, albeit hidden from view by the private nature of many discretionary 
determinations. 
With this as background, let us turn to common instances of rent-seeking in 
the law school environment to examine the impact of competing governance 
structures. 
A. Student Rent-Seeking 
1. Grades 
Grades matter-both to law schools and to law students. The law school as 
an entity has an interest both in maintaining a grading system and in assuring 
that grades measure, with some accuracy, the likely success of students as 
lawyers. First, some grading system is almost certainly necessary for student 
placement purposes. Employers might reduce hiring from a school that refuses 
to sort students and from a school that reduces incentives for students to 
work.29 Moreover, the law school benefits when high grades correlate well 
with performance in practice because firms will be more likely to recruit at a 
school where grades have predictive value. 
Second, prospective applicants, particularly strong applicants, might be 
reluctant to attend a law school with no grading system or an arbitrary grading 
28 Cf Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Acijudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685, 1687-89 (1976) (discussing the potential of rules to operate arbitrarily). 
29 Cf Philip C. Kissam, Law School Examinations, 42 VAND. L. REV. 433, 436 (1989) 
(arguing that grading and ranking systems serve the hiring purposes of many law firms). Of 
course, a school that can be sufficiently selective in the admissions process may be able to 
convince firms to hire its students even if the school did not use grades to sort its students. 
Yale, for instance, can afford to provide less grade differentiation than most other schools 
because potential employers are aware that students admitted are, to an extent greater than at 
most other schools, self-motivated and talented. 
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system, because the absence of meaningful grades will reduce their opportunity 
to stand out. The result might be adverse selection: the students most likely to 
come to the school would be those who intend not to study or those who 
expect, for other reasons, to do poorly. In addition, even if a law school could 
overcome these problems, the absence of grades would create pressure for 
faculty to evaluate students in other, perhaps more time-consuming ways, such 
as by writing extensive recommendation letters. As a result, virtually every 
law school faces irresistible pressure to use a grading system that reflects 
student performance with some degree of accuracy. At the same time, law 
school grades are critical to students. The understandable student pre-
occupation with grades creates additional pressure to ensure that grades are 
assigned fairly rather than arbitrarily. 
How, then, should law schools structure the process of gathering 
information relevant to assigning student grades? One possibility would be to 
have faculty weigh all information they accumulate about student ability 
during the course of the semester. This, however, would be an invitation to 
rent-seeking behavior by students. Because students perceive a significant 
correlation between high grades and professional success, they have an 
incentive to lobby for grades that improve their absolute grade point average 
("GPA") or their relative rank in class. For instance, a student might impress 
upon a faculty member the importance of receiving a high grade in a course 
related to the practice the student hopes to pursue. Or the student whose first 
effort was inadequate might offer to do whatever the faculty member thought 
necessary to improve the grade the student earned. 
Note the problem. This weigh-all-factors grading system places a premium 
on willingness to communicate information about performance rather than on 
performance itself. Of course, most discourse between students and faculty 
has little to do with lobbying for grades or favors; discourse both in and out of 
the classroom is an essential part of the educational process. Some students, 
however, have little interest in discourse but might nevertheless visit faculty 
members for the purpose of creating a positive mental impression that the 
faculty member will remember at grading time. The information that results 
from these encounters is not likely to enhance grading accuracy. First, because 
students will have differential incentives to lobby with faculty members, out-
of-classroom discussions with students are likely to produce a skewed picture 
of student understanding and performance. Second, even if faculty members 
consider only information relevant to student understanding, some students 
will misperceive the factors that will lead to a higher grade and will attempt to 
curry favor in ways that do not reflect greater understanding of course material. 
Anonymous grading of exams and papers, by contrast, reduces the incentive 
for student lobbying before exams and papers are graded. At the same time, 
anonymous grading does not in any way discourage students who consult 
faculty members to enhance their understanding of course material. There is, 
of course, a cost to anonymous grading: to the extent that some students 
perform better orally than in writing, their strengths may receive inadequate 
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consideration. A law school might plausibly conclude that this cost is 
insignificant in a profession where written expression is critical. Alternatively, 
the school might permit modest adjustments to reflect exemplary classroom 
performance. A regime that significantly constrains discretion without 
eliminating it is likely to reduce the incidence of wasteful lobbying efforts. 
Another grading issue involves student requests that faculty members re-
read and re-grade their exams or papers. When a st11dent asks a faculty 
member to review an exam, the student typically expects the faculty member to 
make sure that the faculty member did not miss some significant point in the 
faculty member's initial reading of the exam. The underlying premise is that 
more information-derived from more careful reading-will result in a more 
accurate assessment of student performance. The premise, however, is flawed. 
If the complaining student's analysis can be discerned only after more careful 
reading of the exam, then the student has probably not expressed himself as 
clearly as did his classmates. As a result, the original grade, not the one that 
results from more careful reading, may well be the better indicator of 
performance. More generally, awarding credit based on an isolated reading of 
one exam, out of context with others graded weeks earlier, is unlikely to result 
in a more accurate assessment than the original assessment. To assure that the 
complaining student is treated fairly with respect to his classmates, the faculty 
member would have to reread all exams, not just one, and there would be little 
reason to believe (once the exam is read in context) either (l) that the 
particular student's performance would appear better rather than worse on 
second reading, or (2) that the second reading would be more accurate than the 
first. 
If rereading a student exam is unlikely to yield useful information about the 
appropriate grade, how can law schools deal with student requests in a way 
that limits these requests? One way to deal with this problem is to impose a 
mandatory grading curve. 30 Whether the school requires a particular 
distribution of grades (no more than 10% A's) or a mandatory mean, a curve 
permits the faculty member to explain to the rent-seeking student that she 
cannot raise the student's grade without lowering someone else's grade, an 
alternative that even the rent-seeking student will recognize as prohibitively 
unattractive.31 As with anonymous grading, a grading curve reduces the 
incentive for students who consult faculty only for the purpose of rent-seeking 
30 See Nancy H. Kaufman, A Survey of Law School Grading Practices, 44 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 415, 417-18 (1994) (surveying use of mandatory grading curves at law schools). 
3 1 Some educational literature concludes that grading on a curve is undesirable because it 
fosters competition among students, impeding a cooperative learning environment. See, 
e.g., Terence J. Crooks, The Impact of Classroom Evaluation Practices on Students, 58 REY. 
EDUC. RES. 438, 458 (1988) (finding that "competitive structures involve negative 
interdependence because success for one student reduces the chances that other students will 
succeed"). That disadvantage, however, must be weighed not only against the evils of rent-
seeking but also against the potential unfairness of substantially different grading standards 
in different sections of the same course-a problem particularly important in law schools. 
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without discouraging in any way those students who seek to go over their 
exams as a learning experience. Moreover, not only does a curve discourage 
rent-seeking, but it also reduces the time faculty members must spend with 
students whose focus is rent-seeking: rather than debating the intrinsic merits 
of the student's answer, the faculty member can explain that, whatever the 
answer's merits, other students wrote still better answers. There are, however, 
two limits on the curve's effectiveness in deterring student rent-seeking. First, 
any curve is likely to leave some discretion to faculty members, and second, 
student rent-seekers may not readily appreciate the connection between the 
curve and the faculty member's inability to raise student grades in response to 
lobbying efforts. 32 
A system that precludes all grade changes once grades have been submitted 
to the registrar, or one that precludes all changes absent "computational error" 
or some similar mechanical standard, should be even more effective in 
discouraging rent-seeking. Consider first a system that gives individual faculty 
members complete discretion whether and under what circumstances to adjust 
grades. Some faculty members would change grades; others would not. The 
system has several immediate drawbacks. 33 First, it prevents any faculty 
member from relying on an inflexible rule imposed by higher authority to 
justify her refusal to raise grades. Instead, the faculty member must justify her 
own rule precluding grade adjustments. Second, it permits faculty members 
who do raise grades to impose externalities on those who do not: the very fact 
that some faculty members raise grades will encourage students to lobby with 
all faculty members about grade changes. 
By contrast, if grade changes are prohibited, each student understands, or 
quickly learns, that speaking with a faculty member about an exam is useful 
only to learn from mistakes, not to alter the student's grade. This results in less 
wasted time, both by students and by faculty. 
2. Course Openings 
Suppose the size of available classrooms or the pedagogical objectives of 
the course require limiting enrollment to a number that excludes interested 
32 A mandatory grading curve may also reduce rent-seeking of a different sort: lobbying 
efforts to obtain seats in classes of faculty members who are known to be generous graders. 
A faculty member who offers the prospect of unusually high grades may find a shortage of 
seats in the classroom, inducing lobbying by students eager to fill them. 
33 The text focuses only on drawbacks that lead to increased rent-seeking. The rule also 
has one other serious drawback: it decreases the accuracy of grades as evaluations of student 
performance. When a faculty member raises one student' s grade without re-reading all 
student papers, the chances are slim that the new grade-arrived at after reading a single 
paper in isolation with every incentive to buckle under student pressure-will more 
accurately reflect the student's relative performance than did the original grade, arrived at 
after reading a series of exams and comparing each to the others. 
In addition, when faculty members are bound by rules prohibiting grade changes, they are 
more likely to grade carefully than if they know errors can be corrected easily after the fact. 
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students. How should places in the class be allocated? Unlike the situation 
with law school grades, the law school as an institution has no significant stake 
in which students take particular courses. Presumably, the most efficient 
allocation is one that awards places in enrollment-limited courses to students 
who value those places most. But law schools (and universities in general) 
have universally been unwilling to allocate these scarce resources though a 
market-oriented willingness-to-pay system. A cynic might suggest that the 
resistance to market allocation reflects the ideological proclivities of university 
faculties, but the more likely explanation rests on the public relations disaster a 
university would face if students (and their tuition-paying relatives) understood 
that the payment of tuition to a school with a renowned faculty earned the 
student the privilege to pay additional tuition to take courses with that faculty. 
A school could try to ascertain student interest by interviewing the 
applicants for places in an individual class. But an allocation system based on 
discretionary determinations of student need or interest constitutes an open 
invitation to rent-seeking. Every interested student has a story about why 
Entertainment Law is essential to his or her legal career. Neither an 
administrator nor a faculty member is in a particularly good position to assess 
the relative merit of these stories. As a result, student lobbying does not 
generate particularly reliable information about the value the student attaches 
to a place in the class. The decisionmaker could, of course, allocate spaces in 
the course based on perseverance,34 but that allocation system creates precisely 
the wrong set of incentives; it creates incentives to spend time lobbying for the 
scarce seats in the classroom. 
Indeed, even if a particular decisionmaker were confident that he or she 
could assess the relative need or interest of the claims of applicants for 
positions in the class, the costs of hearing pleas by applicants who do not 
understand why they should be deemed less needy or interested than others 
would often overwhelm the marginal advantages of need or interest based 
allocations. 
By contrast, mechanical determinations minimize opportunities for rent-
seeking. A first-come, first-served system-like a recording system based on a 
"race to the courthouse"35-leaves little room for interpretation, and therefore 
34 Perseverance might be regarded as a surrogate for interest or need: the students who 
persevere are those most willing to commit their valuable time to lobbying for spaces in the 
class, and are therefore the students most interested in the class or most in need of the class. 
Time committed to lobbying, however, generates no intrinsic benefits. Only if there is no 
less costly means of sorting students by need or interest (such as use of prerequisites), and 
only if difference in need among students is significant, would it be sensible to allocate slots 
based on perseverance. 
35 For a discussion of the historical development of recording statutes for real property 
beginning with the enactment of statutes focusing exclusively on the "race" to the court 
house, see Taylor Mattis, Recording Acts: Anachronistic Reliance, 25 REAL PROP. PROB. & 
TR. J. 17, 23-25 (1990) (discussing the evolution of various recording statute schemes). 
Mattis goes on to note how quickly equitable exceptions were engrafted onto pure race 
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little room for lobbying. The rule does have two drawbacks, however. First, it 
invites pleading based on justifications for lateness. Some students will plead 
lack of knowledge about the time for sign-ups; others will offer justifications 
for their failure to sign up on time. Second, a first-come, first-served system 
does cause students to allocate time inefficiently: should they leave summer 
jobs a day early or return from vacation in order to sign up early? No apparent 
gains result from inducing students to sign up at a particular time. A lottery 
system, by contrast, eliminates these difficulties. Students are free to sign up 
at their convenience within whatever period is designated for that purpose, and 
only students who failed to sign up at all-a group with weak equity claims-
will be in a position to raise "notice" issues. 
Moreover, an educational institution could fine-tune a mechanical system by 
developing rules that take into account student interest or need. At the most 
basic level, the institution could establish prerequisites for popular courses or 
could give an absolute preference to third-year students over second-year 
students. The institution could even introduce a more sophisticated market-
like mechanism by allocating to each student a number of points the student 
could use to "bid" for courses that most closely match the student's interest or 
need. Places in each class would then be allocated to students who bid the 
most for them. Any of these mechanical mechanisms for allocating places in 
courses would appear preferable to a system of individualized determination 
based on expressions of student interest. 
There remains the possibility that an individual faculty member enjoys 
interviewing and evaluating applications for scarce spaces in her popular class. 
Moreover, in clinical classes, faculty members may owe an obligation to 
potential clients to select students with the maturity and competence to serve 
client needs.36 If the law school permits individualized selection in these 
situations, the law school would minimize any spillover effects by labeling the 
courses involved as requiring permission of the instructor. The objective 
would be to distinguish them from other classes and to make clear that in other 
classes, lobbying will be useless. 
3. Exam Conditions 
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") is designed to assure that 
students with disabilities enjoy, to every extent possible, a playing field level 
with that of other students.37 Moreover, even apart from federal law, many law 
statutes. Id. at 24-25. 
36 Cf Norman Fell, Development of a Criminal Law Clinic: A Blended Approach, 44 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 275, 297 (1996) (noting maturity needed for students in extemship-type 
clinical programs). 
37 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 
(200 I), encompasses state law schools through Title II (§§ 12131-12165) and private law 
schools through Title Ill (§§ 12181-12189). Title II, section 12132, provides that "no 
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from 
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faculties want to assist students with disabilities to insure a "level playing 
field" for all students.38 As a result of the ADA, increasing numbers of 
students are seeking accommodations of various sorts. 39 This presents law 
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public 
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." Id § 12132. A "public entity" 
is defined by section 1213l(l)(B) as "any department, agency, special purpose district, or 
other instrumentality of a State or States or local government." Id § 12131(1). State-run 
schools fall into this category. Section 12131 defines the term "qualified individual with a 
disability" as 
Id 
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, 
policies, or practices, the removal of ... communication . .. barriers, or the provision 
of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the 
receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public 
entity. 
Title III, section 12182(a) dictates that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on 
the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any 
person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." Id. § 
12182(a). Then, section 12181(7)(1), specifically lists "postgraduate private school[s]" as 
types of public accommodation covered under section 12182. Id§ 12181(7)(1). Section 
12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) includes under its definition of discrimination, "a failure to make 
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are 
necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodation to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that 
making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation." Id § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). Finally, 
section 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) calls for the provision of auxiliary aids and services "unless . .. 
taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, 
privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden." 
Id § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). 
Law schools also fall under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S .C. § 794 (2001 ), which 
mandates in subsection (a) that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... 
shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2001). Section 794(b)(2)(A) 
includes "a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of 
higher education" in the definition of"program or activity." Id § 794(b)(2)(A). 
38 Indeed, some scholars have argued that law schools should provide accommodations 
beyond those required by federal law. See, e.g., Kevin H. Smith, Disabilities, Law Schools, 
and Law Students: A Proactive and Holistic Approach, 32 AKRON L. REV. 1, 8 (1999) 
(mentioning that the ADA creates a floor, not a ceiling, for protection of the disabled). 
39 See, e.g., Phyllis G. Coleman et al., Law Students and the Disorder of Written 
Expression, 26 J. L. & EDUC. I, 9 ( 1997). Coleman also notes that 
[f]or many years, law students did not ask for accommodations and frequently even 
attempted to disguise their disabilities to "pass" as part of the "normal" population .... 
Today, however, just the opposite is true, and even students who do not have 
disabilities are demanding-and receiving-differential treatment. 
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schools with a difficulty: how should the law school determine which 
accommodations should be made available to each student? Some 
accommodations are not problematic. For instance, the number of students 
seeking classroom accommodations--e.g. note-takers or particular seat 
locations-remains relatively small, and making these accommodations 
available does not generate significant rent-seeking opportunities. A note-
taker is likely to be of little value to a student who does not suffer under a 
significant disability. As a result, few students will lobby hard for the right to 
a note-taker, no matter what qualification rules the school adopts. 
With respect to exam conditions, however, the situation is materially 
different. Almost every law student, disabled or not, would benefit ( or 
perceives that he or she would benefit) from extra time on exams. This 
presents law school administration with two challenges: first, determining 
whether a disability exists, and second, determining what accommodation is 
appropriate. 
Law school administrators possess no special expertise in evaluating 
disability claims. And no law school wants to establish an internal 
administrative bureaucracy with the capacity to evaluate individual claims of 
disability. Moreover, any mechanism that accords substantial discretion to law 
school decisionmakers will induce rent-seeking activity by students seeking to 
benefit from the accommodations available. To combat these difficulties, law 
schools will gravitate toward mechanical rules or, where mechanical rules are 
difficult to codify, defer to some other decisionmaker. Thus, when the issue is 
language disability, the law school could provide accommodation only for 
students who can establish that they have lived in an English-speaking country 
for less than three years. Or the law school could provide that only students 
who have not received a degree from an English-language institution are 
entitled to accommodation. Either rule will generate less rent-seeking than a 
rule that permits students to demonstrate, individually, their language 
difficulties. Moreover, a regime of discretion is unlikely to produce more 
Id. at 9 n.31 (citations omitted); see also Laura F. Rothstein, Symposium: The Americans 
with Disabilities Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective: Higher Education and the Future of 
Disability Policy, 52 ALA. L. REv. 241 , 243-44 (2000) (arguing that "[t]he passage of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990 ... opened a floodgate of complaints, both to the 
Department of Education and in the courts" and noting the American Council on 
Education's 1998 report, indicating that one out of every eleven college freshman had a 
disability, a threefold increase from the number reported in I 978); Donald Stone, The 
Impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Legal Education and Academic 
Modifications for Disabled Law Students: An Empirical Study, 44 KAN. L. REV. 567 (1996) 
(reporting academic modification requests to law schools, primarily for extra exam time, but 
also for separate examination rooms, extension of time for degree completion, priority in 
course registration, and authorization to tape record classes, all by virtue of an entitlement 
under the mandates of the ADA). The results of Professor Stone's empirical study show 
that within the eighty law schools surveyed in the 1994-1995 academic year, only two 
percent of requests for modification were denied. Id. 
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accurate information about whether accommodation is necessary to provide a 
level playing field; hence, little is lost by treating the problem mechanically. 
With respect to physical disabilities, one alternative is to require students to 
demonstrate that they received accommodation on the LSAT. A second 
alternative--one that would be more attractive to students claiming 
disabilities-would be to require documentation from a physician. Whichever 
alternative the law school adopts, there would be little room for lobbying 
behavior because the law school would exercise no discretion in evaluating 
disability claims. Deference to physician evaluations might result in 
acceptance of some exaggerated claims of disability (resulting in potential 
unfairness to students without disabilities) but remains a more desirable 
alternative than one based on internal law school evaluation of disability 
claims.40 Moreover, because both physicians and LSAT administrators are 
likely to be better trained and more experienced than law school administrators 
when it comes to evaluating disability claims, deference to these 
decisionmakers is unlikely to interfere with the law school's objective of 
providing a level playing field.41 
Once the law school determines that a disability exists, the school must 
determine what accommodation is reasonable.42 Many accommodations do 
40 Physicians at least have some expertise in the area, even if students will be "biased" 
toward consulting physicians more likely to find disabilities. 
41 By contrast, the easiest rule to administer-no one receives extra time of special 
accommodations-would violate federal law and frustrate the law school's internal 
objective of providing a level playing field. See supra note 37 (discussing applicable 
federal law concerning special accommodations). 
42 34 C.F.R. § 104.44(a) (2000), a regulation promulgated pursuant to the Rehabilitation 
Act, requires that 
[a] recipient [of federal financial assistance] to which this subpart applies shall make 
such modifications to its academic requirements as are necessary to ensure that such 
requirements do not discriminate or have the effect of discriminating, on the basis of 
handicap, against a qualified handicapped applicant or student . . . . Modifications may 
include changes in the length of time permitted for the completion of degree 
requirements, substitution of specific courses required for the completion of degree 
requirements, and adaptation of the manner in which specific courses are conducted. 
34 C.F.R. § 104.44(a) (2000). 
Title III of the ADA requires "reasonable" modifications "unless the entity can 
demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations." 42 U.S.C. § 
12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2001). Although it can be argued that working within limited time 
constraints is fundamental to the nature of the law school program, most of the cases 
addressing extra exam time focus on whether the individual had learning or other disabilities 
to justify the accommodation and not whether additional exam time constitutes a 
fundamental alteration to the school' s program. See, e.g., Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law 
Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1998). Indeed, the generally accepted wisdom, as reported 
(disapprovingly) by Freedley Hunsicker, is that time extensions do not threaten essential 
standards. Freedley Hunsicker, Learning Disabilities, Law Schools and the Lowering of the 
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not invite rent-seeking at all. Few students would feign disabilities to obtain 
readers, scribes, or isolated test-taking environments. Offering these 
accommodations to disabled students may be costly to the law school but will 
not generate a flurry of applications for similar treatment. 
Extra time on examinations, however, presents entirely different concerns. 
Because all students believe that they would benefit from extra time, a rule that 
gives substantially more time to disabled students will generate additional 
efforts to qualify as disabled. The law school as an institution has a limited 
number of strategies it can employ to deal with the issue. First, the law school 
could individually determine how much extra time each student should receive 
for his or her particular disability. But few law school administrators will be 
equipped to fine-tune the extra time available to a student's particular 
disability. Information provided by individual students and their advocates 
will be unhelpful in making comparative evaluations, yet the prospect of 
individualized determinations will encourage individual students to lobby for 
as much time as possible. 
Second, the law school could provide a blanket percentage of extra time for 
all disabilities or for all disabilities of a particular type. The first problem with 
this solution has nothing to do with rent-seeking; there is little reason to expect 
that such a blanket rule would advance the purposes of the ADA- leveling the 
playing field. On top of that, if the institution's blanket extra-time provision is 
generous, it will create incentives for students to seek a disability diagnosis. A 
more stringent limit on the available extension of time-perhaps an additional 
ten or twenty percent of the time of the exam-would reduce the incentive to 
seek disability status but might also disadvantage students with particularly 
serious disabilities. 
The third and perhaps best approach would be to increase the time available 
for all students. If all students were allocated six hours to take a three-hour 
exam, there would be reduced incentive to seek disability status even if 
disabled students were entitled to fifty percent more time on exams; for 
students without disabilities, the marginal benefit of the right to sit in an exam 
room for nine hours will approach zero. Moreover, if the law school removes 
artificial time pressure from exams, the school might be able to dispense with 
extra time altogether. Lawyers rarely have to provide clients or courts with a 
substantively correct answer to a complex legal question within the hour or 
two that might be allotted for a typical exam question, but lawyers, disabled or 
not, must have the ability to perform legal tasks within a reasonable time 
period. Hence, if law school exams give all students a reasonable time to 
analyze a legal problem, the law school may be ab.le to avoid giving disabled 
students still more time by demonstrating that completion of the exam' s 
questions within the reasonable period available to all students is "essential to 
the program of instruction being pursued. "43 
Bar, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. l , 13-14 (2000). 
43 See 34 C.F.R. § l04.44(a) (1996) (stating that accommodations need not encompass 
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4. Scholarships and the Market for Students 
Not all of the benefits law schools confer on students constitute economic 
rents. Students are not fungible. If they were, law schools would not need 
admissions offices. Instead, law schools would allocate spaces in the entering 
class based on willingness of students to pay the highest tuition. All schools 
recognize, however, that strong students increase the institution's reputation, 
both in terms of entry statistics examined by prospective students, and in terms 
of placement success.44 As a result, market forces play a significant role in 
where students attend law school. Institutional prestige and geographical 
location probably play primary roles in student decisions, but financial aid, or 
scholarship money, is also significant, especially in areas where law schools 
face competition from schools who are close substitutes in terms of geography 
and prestige. As a result, scholarship awards are not entirely rents paid by law 
schools but reflect the cost of luring valuable students to the institution in a 
competitive market.45 
If law schools award scholarship money to meet competition for strong 
students, the awards can be packaged in various ways. The school could 
guarantee scholarship money for three years, or could make continuation of the 
scholarship contingent upon performance in law school. Which alternative is 
preferable depends in large measure on the market preferences of prospective 
students. If 75% of scholarship recipients earn a 3.0 average in the first-year 
of law school, the law school should generally be indifferent-from a financial 
standpoint-between awarding a $10,000 scholarship guaranteed for three 
years, and a $12,000 scholarship whose renewal is contingent upon 
maintenance of a 3.0 average after the first year.46 If students prefer to bet on 
their own performance, the law school is better off providing conditional 
scholarships; if students are more conservative, the law school is better off not 
imposing conditions.47 Neither system, however, has any immediate impact on 
requirements "essential to the program of instruction being pursued") 
44 The institution's reputation for serving the elite may, in fact, be the most significant 
academic measure of the institution's success. See Harry First, Competition in the Legal 
Education Industry, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1328 (1978). 
45 See Howard 0. Hunter, Thoughts on Being a Dean, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 641, 643 
(2000) (stating that law schools that want to remain competitive according to the generally 
accepted criteria will face continuing pressure to increase scholarships). 
46 If the law school awards a guaranteed scholarship of $10,000 per year, the total cost 
over three years will be $30,000 per scholarship. If the law school offers $12,000 for the 
first year, and 75% of the first year recipients receive $12,000 in each of the succeeding two 
years, the total cost per scholarship will be $12,000 + (0.75 x $24,000), for a total of 
$30,000. 
47 The effect of the two alternatives on future alumni donations might also be significant, 
but it is not clear what impact each rule would have. Students who lose scholarship money 
for inadequate performance are not likely to be significant donors (a disadvantage of 
conditional scholarships), but students who receive larger scholarships and keep them may 
be more likely to be generous (a corresponding advantage of conditional scholarships, 
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the incidence of rent-seeking. 
If the institution awards scholarships conditioned on law school 
performance, however, rent-seeking problems may arise later, when some 
students fail to meet the performance standard. Those students will inevitably 
seek to retain their scholarship money, generally attributing their poor 
performance to some factor beyond their control-poor teachers, outside 
commitments, or ill health. These students will generally have no option to 
transfer; in light of their performance in the first year, they have less market 
value to all law schools than they had before they started. The law school may 
nevertheless decide to allocate some money to some of these students in order 
to cultivate better student relations (and, ultimately, better alumni relations). 
This would especially be true if an unexpected number of scholarship students 
performed poorly. But beyond the money allocated to promote student and 
alumni relations, any other scholarship money allocated to this group 
constitutes economic rent. 
The law school could hear individualized appeals in which students offer 
explanations for unexpectedly poor performance. This course of action might 
make sense if law school administrators could reliably sort students whose 
poor performance was aberrational from those whose poor performance is 
likely to continue. But at most law schools, past performance, not the 
assessment of an administrator, is likely to be a better predictor of future 
performance. Moreover, even if administrators were confident in their ability 
to sort under-performing students, the sorting enterprise would encourage all 
students who have lost scholarship money to lobby with the designated 
decisionmaker. If, by contrast, the law school employs a mechanical standard 
(e.g. all students with GPAs of 2.9 or above retain 25% of their original 
scholarship money), both the volume of lobbying and the length of time 
expended on each lobbying session may be somewhat reduced.48 
Law schools also face scholarship issues with students who have performed 
particularly well after a year of law school. Students near the top of the class 
may consider transferring to more prestigious institutions. If the law school 
wants to retain these students, additional scholarship money provides a 
significant inducement for students to stay. A policy awarding additional 
scholarships to persons who express an interest in transferring, however, 
creates perverse incentives. If the policy becomes known, all of the best 
students in the class, including those with no desire to transfer, will apply to 
transfer. A policy that gives the appropriate administrator discretion to award 
scholarships to particularly deserving students ( or to students most likely to 
transfer) creates incentives both to fill out transfer applications and to lobby 
which permit larger initial awards). 
48 Note, however, that lobbying will still occur. The marginal cost of the lobbying effort 
to the student is small compared to the potential gain. Even if the probability of success is 
very small, thirty minutes of lobbying will generally be worthwhile if the payoff would be 
retention ofa $5,000 scholarship. 
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with the decisionmaker. In addition, if a particular student fails to secure a 
scholarship because he or she is deemed less worthy than other students, the 
adverse decision may cause more demoralization than if the decision were less 
subjective. As a result, the preferable course is to award scholarship money to 
all students who meet a certain well-defined threshold, such as all students in 
the top five percent of the class or all those who achieve a GPA of3.6. 
5. Discourse, Participation, and Group Rent-Seeking 
The analysis so far has treated rent-seeking as an opportunity cost to the 
participants: if students were not involved in the rent-seeking process, they 
would be able to engage in more productive pursuits. Suppose, however, that 
for some participants, the rent-seeking process generates positive benefits. In 
particular, suppose that students enjoy lobbying for benefits.49 How, if at all, 
would the analysis change? 
First, for those students who enjoy lobbying irrespective of result, a rule that 
discourages rent-seeking will have no impact. They can continue to enjoy 
lobbying; the rule assures only that the lobbying will be unsuccessful. The 
only students who would suffer a real loss from a system of mechanical rules 
would be those for whom lobbying with a prospect for success creates value 
apart from the gains actually realized from successful lobbying. But that loss 
may be more than offset by the gains to people who view lobbying as a cost 
and now receive assurance that they will not suffer when they exercise their 
preference not to lobby for benefits. 
A more compelling argument is that many students value not lobbying per 
se, but participation in the governance of an institution that significantly affects 
their lives. so But the desire for participation can be accommodated with less 
institutional cost and greater potential benefit by providing students with input 
in the process of developing institutional rules, for instance, through 
membership on faculty committees rather than by encouraging lobbying for 
personal benefits. 
49 It is less plausible to assume that faculty and administrators enjoy listening to 
complaints; even if they do, it is not clear why it is good for the institution for them to spend 
time this way. Few enjoy the process so much that they would leave if they were forced to 
spend less time responding to student lobbying. 
5° Civic republican theory emphasizes the value of participation in fostering a sense of 
community. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Republican Civic Tradition: Beyond the 
Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1556 (1988) ("[O]n the republican view, political 
participation is not only instrumental in the ordinary sense; it is also a vehicle for the 
inculcation of such characteristics as empathy, virtue, and feelings of community .. .. "). 
But see Samuel lssacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. 
L. REv. 1627, 1636-37 (1999) ("Whenever we participate in the much-vaunted town 
meeting, our jobs and hobbies go untended and our friends and families go ignored. Direct 
democracy requires work. Worse yet, the town meeting itself can often tum nasty and 
unpleasant. Despite the hopes of civic republicans, the agora is no great fun for most 
people."). 
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Beyond regular participation in the rule-making process, student 
participation can ease institutional tensions when unforeseen events create 
difficulties not covered by existing rules. One example from my tenure is 
illustrative. A visiting professor took much of an open-book Torts exam out of 
a student review book, one that the professor did not require students to 
purchase. The book also included an analysis of the question. A few students, 
but not many, had the book during the exam. When students discovered the 
situation, outrage surfaced over the resulting unfairness. One way to deal with 
the situation would have been to gather facts about the number of students who 
had the book and who read the analysis and then issue an edict providing an 
administrative resolution: students all earn "Ps" in the course, or students 
retake the exam, or students choose from these or other alternatives. The edict 
solution, however, would have been accompanied by two disadvantages. First, 
it would have deprived the decisionmaker-me--of student suggestions about 
optimal solutions I might not otherwise have considered. Second, however fair 
the ultimate resolution, the edict solution would have deprived students of a 
vehicle for expressing their collective anger about the injustice they had 
suffered and would have resulted in a series of individual visits both to the 
professor and to the dean's office complaining about the nature of the choices 
available. Another alternative, and the one I chose, was to hold a structured 
meeting with all interested students, placing alternatives before the students but 
expressing openness to student proposals. This alternative provided students 
with an opportunity to vent and to participate in the process of selecting an 
appropriate remedy. 
The meeting was clearly an invitation for students to engage in rent-seeking 
behavior. Nevertheless, student participation in developing a solution to 
unusual problems like these has several advantages. First, encouraging rent-
seeking in a group meeting undoubtedly reduces the numbers of students who 
will express their outrage and offer their proposed solutions in private meetings 
with faculty and administrators. On the whole, then, less time may be devoted 
to resolving the problem. Second, a group setting is less conducive to rent-
seeking because whatever benefits may be derived from successful rent-
seeking will be shared among a large number of recipients, thus reducing the 
differential advantage to any individual rent-seeker.51 This causes individuals 
to think twice about pursuing purely personal goals, especially ones that 
disadvantage others. 
Perhaps most importantly, when students offer proposals in a group setting, 
each student is more likely to recognize that his preferred solution may be 
unacceptable to other students. For instance, raising the grades of all students 
51 Cf Buchanan, supra note I, at 11-12 ( arguing that if the differential advantages 
granted to persons as a result of a government allocation are eliminated, it becomes 
irrational for any persons to engage in rent-seeking); see RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 208-09 
( 1985) ( discussing the advantages of a system in which any individual actor may only 
demand additional benefits ifhe tenders them to others as well). 
1164 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1141 
who took the tainted exam would have been unacceptable to students in other 
Torts classes whose class rank might be adversely affected by such a solution. 
When students see, in an open forum, the various positions advanced by their 
peers, they are less likely to press extreme positions both because they may 
better see other perspectives on the issue and because they understand that the 
law school administration is unlikely to adopt a position strongly opposed by 
other affected students. 52 As a result, the quality of the suggestions generated 
at such a session is likely to be higher than when a single student privately 
seeks a benefit from a single administrator or faculty member. Moreover, open 
discussion among students with differing points of view may increase the 
likelihood that students will accept a compromise solution. 53 
The basic point is this: not all participation in governance matters is rent-
seeking. When an unforeseen event at the institution creates a general sense of 
injustice, some resolutions of the problem do more than distribute rents among 
students. Although it is unrealistic to assume that students as a group can be 
dissuaded from engaging in rent-seeking behavior, some students will strive to 
reach solutions that improve the general morale of the student body. The 
challenge for the law school administration is to channel rent-seeking behavior 
in ways that give students a role in remedying the injustice, thus blunting 
hostility toward the institution, and generating better information in the 
process. 
B. Faculty Rent-Seeking 
The faculty plays a critical role in the quality of any law school. First, 
faculty scholarship enhances law school prestige, which in tum aids the law 
school in recruiting both good students and strong faculty. Second, high-
quality teaching has an obvious impact on alumni support, but also on 
admissions, through word-of-mouth. As a result, every law school has an 
interest in promoting high-quality research and teaching and in retaining 
faculty who are strong scholars and teachers. Because of the important role 
faculty scholarship plays in evaluating the quality of a law school, a law school 
dean would ordinarily want to allocate scarce resources in ways that promote 
52 See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 1549 (arguing that self-interested positions "should be 
revisable in light of collective discussion and debate, bringing to bear alternative 
perspectives and additional information"); see also Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican 
Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1529 (The civic 
republican position is that "the deliberative process, if properly structured, will 
transform ... values and ultimately reveal commonalities shared by different citizens. It is 
this transformative power of politics that enables the polity to reach consensus about the 
common good."). 
53 There is, however, one significant countervailing cost. An open forum may lead some 
people to attend a meeting to protect their perceived interests even if they would ordinarily 
trust the law school administration to safeguard their interests. These students-who might 
be among the most diligent-would rather study than lobby unless the prospect of deal 
making leads them to fear that their interests will be ignored. 
2003] RENT-SEEKING IN LAW SCHOOLS 1165 
faculty scholarship. Among the benefits that are generally attractive to faculty 
are salary, research stipends, and reduced teaching loads. Each law school 
must determine how to allocate those benefits. In each case, a variety of 
allocation mechanisms are available. 
1. Faculty Salaries and the Role of Markets 
Faculty salaries-the most significant benefit received by most faculty 
members--could be set mechanically or the dean could retain discretion to set 
salaries. The advantage of a mechanical formula, such as one that sets salaries 
by some combination of years out of law school, years in teaching, and number 
of advanced degrees, is obvious: the formula leaves little room for lobbying by 
individual faculty members. The disadvantage, however, is equally obvious: 
the law school that sets salaries without regard to market value risks losing its 
most marketable (presumably its most productive) faculty members. 
For many faculty members, a high percentage of salary is economic rent; 
tenure protects them in their current jobs, but, because they have few prospects 
of comparably attractive employment, they would not leave their current 
schools even if their salaries were cut drastically.54 For other faculty members, 
however, very little of their salary is economic rent; because they have other 
opportunities, their salary reflects market value not economic rents. The 
reason these faculty members have other opportunities is that law schools 
recognize that institutional reputation and the ability to attract students depends 
in part on the reputation of the law school's faculty, both as scholars and as 
teachers. A law school that loses its strongest faculty members risks a loss in 
reputation. As a result, any law school dean will want the flexibility to meet 
market competition for the school's strongest faculty members.55 
Once a dean asserts the discretion to meet the market, however, any lock-
step salary system collapses. If the dean announced that he would depart from 
the lock-step system only for faculty members with other offers, the system 
would encourage other faculty members to waste time soliciting offers they 
have no intention of taking. 56 This cost to the law school would probably 
exceed the cost generated by a system that gives the dean discretion over 
salary, and therefore permits lobbying by individual faculty members. Market 
forces, then, lead to a system that gives the dean discretion over salaries. 
54 See Geoffrey Brennan & Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking in Academia, in TOWARD A 
THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY, supra note I, at 344, 345-50 (arguing that the costs 
associated with changing teaching positions and the fact that geographical preference often 
plays a role in a teacher taking a university position deters professors from leaving their 
current positions). 
55 See id. at 351 (arguing that a dean or other academic decisionmaker may "rationally 
seek to maximize the prestige of his department, because this in tum maximizes his own 
market value and his bargaining position in relation to his own salary") 
56 See id. at 353 (discussing the costs to faculty members and schools of searching out 
offers to encourage an active bidding process for academics). 
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2. Other Faculty Benefits 
If market forces make discretion preferable with respect to faculty salaries, 
the question is whether those same forces require discretion with respect to 
other benefits. If discretion over salary is sufficient to permit the dean to 
account for market forces, limiting discretion in other areas diminishes the 
opportunity for rent-seeking. For instance, if salaries and research stipends 
were both discretionary, the dean would face two pressure points for lobbying 
efforts rather than one. In most circumstances, discretion in salaries should be 
sufficient to meet market forces; from the individual faculty member's 
perspective, the dean's offer of an additional dollar is at least as attractive if it 
comes in salary as if it comes in research money. Similarly, with teaching 
loads, the school could set a fixed price at which faculty members might buy 
their way out of some of their teaching obligations. Then, giving the dean 
salary discretion would be sufficient to meet reduced-load offers from other 
institutions. 
At that point, the question becomes whether a discretionary decision-making 
process generates information in a way that improves the quality of decisions 
or creates useful incentives for faculty members who are not candidates for 
departure to other institutions. 
a. Research Stipends 
Many law schools award summer research stipends to faculty members. 
The theory behind the research stipend is that faculty will be more productive 
if rewarded for devoting summers to research rather than to extended vacation 
or to consulting of some sort. In theory, then, research stipends are not 
economic rents; they are payments to induce faculty members to engage in 
work that is valuable to the institution. 
In practice, however, research stipends do create economic rents for many 
faculty members because those faculty members would engage in research and 
publication whether or not stipends were made available. For these faculty 
members, love of scholarship or professional prestige provides adequate 
incentive for publication. Payments made to them for activities they would 
pursue in any event constitute economic rents. 
If the law school's objective were to maximize productivity, the law school 
might concentrate on awarding stipends to those faculty who would produce 
scholarship if awarded stipends but not otherwise. Such a system, however, 
would entail significant cost. First, the system might cause demoralization of 
the institution's most productive faculty members. 57 In addition, it would not 
be easy to sort those for whom stipends provide a necessary incentive from 
those for whom stipends constitute rent. Moreover, if it became clear that the 
law school sorted on that basis, the school would create an incentive for all 
faculty to disguise their inclination to write i.n order to qualify for stipends, 
57 Ultimately, unless these productive faculty members were compensated in some other 
way, as through salary, their demoralization might encourage them to leave the institution. 
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making the sorting process even more difficult. 
In light of these difficulties, the emphasis of any allocation process will be 
on rewarding productive faculty members without assessing whether they 
would write without stipends. The result, however, is that many of the stipend 
payments will constitute economic rent. How, then, should these payments be 
allocated? 
One approach is for the dean to solicit research proposals from interested 
faculty members. The dean, or a faculty committee, then evaluates the 
proposals to decide which merit financial assistance. This system creates 
significant incentive for rent-seeking by faculty members. First, faculty 
members may devote inordinate time to developing rese~rch proposals rather 
than to completing the research itself. Especially if the proposals are solicited 
well before the time for which the stipend is awarded, the faculty members' 
plans may change, making time spent on the proposal largely useless. Second, 
the dean or the committee must read and evaluate the proposals, and, if a 
committee is involved, debate their relative merits. Third, faculty members 
may lobby with the committee or the dean on behalf of their proposals, and, 
after decisions are made, the committee or the dean will have to explain their 
decisions to disappointed faculty members. 
By contrast, the school could allocate stipends to faculty who meet 
predetermined mechanical criteria. For instance, stipends could be awarded to 
all faculty who have published at least one law review article within the 
preceding two years or one book within the preceding four years. This system 
is a less costly way of allocating stipends if we regard them as rents. At the 
same time, this method provides appropriate incentives to faculty members 
who might be induced into greater productivity: continued eligibility depends 
on continued productivity. The criteria could be made more stringent or more 
lenient or simply different, depending on the institution's aspirations. The 
mechanical system, as we have seen in other contexts, involves a smaller 
expenditure of faculty and administrative time. 
One might object that the mechanical system places no premium on high 
quality scholarship. If stipends are simply economic rents, it is not clear why, 
from the institution's standpoint, the quality of the work should matter. Even 
ifwe assume more realistically that stipends do have some incentive effect, the 
objection ignores two facts. First, a mechanical system could be designed to 
reward quality, at least as measured by external criteria; that is, the stipend 
could be enhanced for faculty who have book contracts with top university 
presses or articles published at top law reviews. Second, if the goal of the 
stipends is to generate more faculty productivity, the goal might be better 
achieved by inducing weaker or more reluctant scholars to devote more effort 
to scholarship rather than by focusing heavily on those whose prior success 
predicts that they will continue to generate high quality work even without 
additional incentives. 
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b. Reduced Teaching Loads 
Faculty members in the midst of a major research project often find it 
helpful to have a reduced teaching load during a semester of unusually 
intensive work. Unless pressing institutional needs conflict with the faculty 
member's preferences, most law faculties and most deans would want to 
accommodate an effort likely to result in significant scholarship. The question 
is how to do so.58 
One alternative is to allocate reduced loads to faculty members who request 
them whenever the dean or a faculty committee is convinced of the merit of the 
faculty member's request. Such a system, however, places a premium on 
lobbying. Those faculty members willing to bend the dean's ear obtain 
benefits not available to those who don't ask for them. That system, in tum, 
encourages more faculty members to bend the dean's ear when they could be 
reading, writing, answering student questions, or engaging in other productive 
activities. 
An alternative approach is to create a "credit bank." If the ordinary teaching 
load at the institution is eleven credits per year, a faculty member who prefers 
to teach only eight credits in a particular year can earn the right to do so by 
teaching fourteen the previous year or twelve for each of the three preceding 
years. In this way, faculty members earn a reduced teaching load as a matter 
of "right" rather than by lobbying for the reduced load as a matter of grace. 
Rent-seeking would bring a faculty member no rewards. 
Moreover, the teaching load need not be identical for all faculty members. 
That is, faculty members who meet a pre-determined publication requirement 
could be allocated a smaller load than those who do not meet that requirement. 
This system also allocates reduced loads a matter of right and reduces the 
incentive to engage in rent-seeking behavior. 
III. THE EDUCATIONAL VALUE OF RENT-SEEKING 
In many educational institutions, rent-seeking skills are of little value to 
students. Few architects, physicians, or engineers will derive any professional 
advantage from a finely-honed ability to seek economic rents. But law schools 
train law students to practice law. Rent-seeking is the bread and butter of 
many areas of legal practice. Litigation, negotiation, and lobbying-activities 
central to the practice of law-require expertise at extracting economic rents. 
Is it misguided, then, to discourage rent-seeking, particularly among law 
students? Rather than treating rent-seeking as an evil that distracts students 
from their studies, should we treat rent-seeking as an occasion for education 
consistent with the mission of the law school? 
One of my colleagues organized his course on this premise. The class ~as 
58 The assumption here is that the institution's teaching needs generally require faculty to 
teach a full load, and that the dean cannot simply permit anyone engaged in research to 
teach less or not at all. Hence, any reduction in teaching load for one faculty member 
requires someone else to pick up the slack. 
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limited to 24 students. Under the law school's rules, classes of 25 students or 
more are subject to a mandatory grading curve. More than 25 students came to 
the first scheduled class. My colleague focused class discussion on a number 
of issues: should the limit on class size be removed to permit the extra students 
to take the class; should the students lobby with the Associate Dean for an 
exemption from the mandatory curve; should some students volunteer to drop 
out of the class as a formal matter and substitute an independent study, thus 
keeping the class size below 25 (as far as the Registrar would know), while 
permitting all interested students to remain in the class? 
When I learned of this classroom exercise, my first reaction was anger. My 
colleague was wasting his students ' time-and mine- in what would be a 
fruitless effort to evade rules adopted by the faculty. On reflection, however, I 
recognized that the rent-seeking enterprise, while bad for the Associate Dean, 
was of considerable value to students who were honing skills that would be of 
value to them throughout their legal careers. In the course of lobbying with 
me, students would learn how to make an argument and, in light of my 
responses, how to sharpen that argument. They would also learn the 
importance of tailoring their arguments to the decisionmaker involved. These 
skills, while of marginal importance to a future engineer or musician, are 
central to the success of a future lawyer. 
This insight, however, did not convince me that law school administrators 
should abandon rules for discretion in order to increase opportunities for 
education through rent-seeking. Students learn as much or more through 
unsuccessful rent-seeking as they would if the rent-seeking were successful. 
To the extent that my colleague's enterprise could be treated as a clinical 
offering in supervised rent-seeking, students receive the same hands-on 
training if they fail as if they succeed. 
Retaining mechanical rules has another advantage. In the outside world, 
lawyers engage in rent-seeking in a variety of legal environments. The 
strategies most likely to be successful when lawyers appeal to decisionmakers 
constrained by rules are different from those that would be optimal with 
decisionmakers who enjoy broad discretion. In an environment heavily shaped 
by rules, lawyers must focus their arguments more sharply. They are not 
finished when they convince the decisionmaker of the rightness of their 
position; they must also provide the decisionmaker a "road map" through the 
constraints the decisionmaker faces . Many decisionmakers-in particular, 
low-level administrative agency decisionmakers--operate in a rule-bound 
environment. Courts, especially inferior courts, also operate under significant 
constraints. If rent-seeking in law school is treated as training for the 
profession, the training will be better if the student learns to tailor her 
argument to the constraints faced by the decisionmaker. 
Of course, if law students face a regime of mechanical rules, some of them 
will choose not to rent-seek at all. But that too is a learning experience, 
perhaps the most valuable one. Lawyers must know how to evaluate when 
rent-seeking is likely to be successful (and when it is not) so they can advise 
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clients whether the rent-seeking enterprise is worth the necessary expenditure 
of resources. And, given the few opportunity costs facing most law students 
who consider rent-seeking on their own behalf, it is hardly likely that they will 
err on the side of abandoning an enterprise that has little expected yield. 
Finally, even if a regime that encourages student rent-seeking effectively 
trains law students, the training is not cost-effective. The training tends to be 
one-on-one; a single student-and no one else-learns from each encounter 
with a law school administrator. Too many such encounters would require 
employment of additional law school administrators, and it is unlikely that 
such expenditure would be preferable from an educational standpoint to hiring 
additional faculty members who might provide equivalent ( or, more likely, 
better) training in a classroom or clinical setting. 
CONCLUSION 
This essay is not intended as a blueprint for the eradication of rent-seeking 
behavior in law schools. Indeed, because the opportunity costs facing student 
rent-seekers is often so low, rent-seeking will always be with us. 
My objectives have been more modest. First, I have vented my personal 
frustrations at the hours I have spent dealing with rent-seekers, hours that could 
have been better spent dealing with more pressing student and faculty 
concerns. Second, I have distinguished those student and faculty lobbying 
efforts that are likely to produce information useful in improving the quality of 
law school decisions from those efforts unlikely to generate useful information. 
Many of these opportunities for rent-seeking had not been evident to me as a 
faculty member. Third, I have demonstrated that the policies a law school 
adopts can have an impact, albeit at the margins, on the frequency and duration 
of rent-seeking activity. Finally, I have explained why rules designed to 
control rent-seeking behavior may have a positive impact even on the 
education of future rent-seekers. 
